Moving out the parental home and partnership formation as social determinants of low fertility by Esteve, Albert et al.
Vienna Yearbook of Population Research 2020 (Vol. 18), pp. 33–37
Moving out the parental home and partnership
formation as social determinants of low fertility
Albert Esteve1,∗, Diederik Boertien1, Ryohei Mogi1, and Mariona Lozano1
1 The challenge
The study of fertility across societies has been a core subject of demography, and
is one of the main areas of theory development. As countries went from having
fertility well above the replacement level to having fertility near the replacement
level (2.1 children), one of the most widely accepted theoretical frameworks in
demography emerged: the demographic transition. This transition was primarily
driven by the social, health, and economic transformations associated with the gen-
eral process of modernization (Notestein 1953; Lee 2003). But in many countries,
fertility continued to decrease, falling to below the replacement level. The second
demographic transition (SDT) was proposed to explain these changes (Van de Kaa
1987; Lesthaeghe 2014). The SDT placed more emphasis on ideational and cultural
changes than on structural factors. Today, fertility below the replacement level is
observed in virtually all high-income countries, and is spreading rapidly to other
areas of the world. In 2017, 96 out of the 217 countries covered by the World Bank
data reported total fertility rates of below 2.1 children per woman. Understanding
the variations in fertility trends across these countries poses a new challenge for
demography. To meet this challenge, we stress the need to identify and quantify
the relative importance of the proximate social determinants of low fertility. We
suggest that researchers investigating this issue pay particular attention to the effects
of moving out of the parental home and partnership formation.
We argue that the broad social, cultural, and economic forces that were cited
to explain the occurrence of the first and second demographic transitions do not
necessarily suffice to explain the variations in fertility across countries and time
after these transitions have taken place. Neither the idea that further development
will eventually reverse the declining trend in fertility (Myrskylä et al. 2009), nor
the abundance of micro-level studies on the many factors that are associated with
childbearing (Balbo et al. 2013), have yielded convincing explanations for why
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childbearing behaviour varies across low-fertility contexts. The idea that lowest-low
fertility was just a stage in a process that would eventually lead to a recovery
of fertility driven by advances in development or changes in gender relationships
(Myrskylä et al. 2009; Goldscheider et al. 2015; Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015)
has been challenged by recent declines in fertility in the alleged forerunner countries
(e.g., Sweden and Norway). At the micro level of analysis, the growing availability
of longitudinal data and the increasing sophistication of methods have resulted in an
accumulation of findings documenting “causal” mechanisms affecting childbearing
behaviour (Balbo et al. 2013). However, most of these findings have come from a
selected group of countries (e.g., Germany, the United Kingdom, Nordic countries)
for which data are available. Most importantly, it is not always clear how much these
factors contribute to overall fertility levels at the macro level – and it is even less
clear how much they contribute to cross-national differences in fertility rates.
To gain a better understanding of cross-national variations in low-fertility coun-
tries, we should aim to decompose cross-national variations in fertility rates based
on a renewed set of proximate determinants of individual fertility decisions. Such
an effort will require us to identify the proximate determinants of fertility at the
individual level, and to quantify their contributions to the aggregate measures of
fertility. We will also need to develop a broader understanding of how fertility
decisions are constrained by desires and preferences for childbearing (and their
importance relative to other life plans and projects), the biological limits to
reproduction, and the resources and conditions required for achieving these goals.
We argue that decomposition and standardization techniques can help us bridge the
gap between the micro and macro levels of analysis when investigating how social
institutions and national cultures penetrate the most personal aspects of peoples’
lives. In the next section, we outline an analytical framework that may prove helpful
in structuring this kind of analysis.
2 A tentative framework
We would like to suggest some basic elements and considerations that should be
included in an analytical framework of below-replacement fertility in high-income
countries. The framework proposed by Bongaarts is, of course, an inescapable point
of reference for this effort (Bongaarts 1978). However, in the below-replacement
era, several of the proximate determinants of fertility cited by Bongaarts have
become less relevant (e.g., age at first intercourse, breastfeeding periods), while
others remain just as important (e.g., fecundity and health). Here, we would like to
start by emphasizing the following determinants.
First, fertility continues to be limited by fecundity. Assisted reproduction has
extended the range of ages at which women can reproduce, but these extensions
are more modest than the extensions of other social (e.g., expected age at first
partnership or childbirth) and biological limits (e.g., life expectancy) that have taken
place in recent decades. Thus, fertility decisions continue to be clearly constrained
Albert Esteve et al. 35
by age. Whereas age 50 is conventionally adopted as the end of a woman’s
reproductive years, problems with conception and the viability of pregnancies tend
to emerge at much younger ages. The continued postponement of fertility decisions
is in direct conflict with the ability to get pregnant after a certain age.
Second, the vast majority of children in low-fertility countries are wanted children.
Women and men have control over their fertility decisions due to the widespread
use of contraception and, in some countries, legal abortion. However, many women
and men do not end up having all of the children they claim they would like
to have. Three indicators summarize people’s preferences regarding childbearing:
ideal family size, ideal age at first birth, and voluntary childlessness. The data
from low-fertility countries systematically show that the observed fertility level
is below the ideal fertility level of around two children per woman, which has
been constant over time and across Western countries (Sobotka and Beaujouan
2014). When available, the data on preferences regarding parenthood timing in
low-fertility counties indicate that the normative age at first birth is rarely below
25 years (Testa 2007). Younger men and women may have plans to become parents
in the future, but they do not necessarily intend to have children soon. Finally, it
appears that less than 10% of women are voluntarily childless (Kreyenfeld and
Konietzka 2017). These findings clearly indicate that the observed fertility trends
are not in line with fertility preferences. Which determinants contribute to this gap
between observed and desired fertility? How is this gap built over the life course,
and how do differences in individual life courses accumulate to create cross-national
differences?
To answer these questions, it is crucial that we identify the key period in people’s
lives in which cross-country differences in fertility can arise. This period is defined
by two age limits: the normative age at first childbearing at the lower end (i.e.,
the point at which people are willing to start having children), and the biological
limits of reproduction at the upper end (i.e., the point at which a woman is no
longer fertile). The existing evidence from high-income countries with below-
replacement-level fertility indicates that cross-national differences arise between
ages 25 and 40, and specifically among women in their thirties. Hence, assuming
that science does not produce any major breakthroughs that extend the age limits of
human reproduction, it appears that the window of time in the life course in which
childbearing typically occurs is 10 to 15 years.
It is within this age range that we have to identify the additional proximate
determinants of individual fertility, and quantify their contributions to macro-level
rates of fertility. We argue that the two determinants that contribute the most to low
fertility within this age range are leaving the parental home and partnership forma-
tion. Even today, the vast majority of births in high-income countries take place
among co-residing couples, either married or cohabiting, who are economically
independent and have their own housing. There are clear interactions between these
two determinants. While a young person may leave the parental home and form a
union at the same time, the likelihood that these two life transitions will coincide is
declining (Buchmann and Kriesi 2011). There are also individuals who have a stable
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partner, but do not live with their partner (Levin 2004). We argue that partnership
formation is the key element to focus on when studying determinants of fertility.
While recent research has examined couple dynamics and gender relationships after
union formation and their influence on fertility decisions, we hypothesize that the
intensity and timing of partnership formation are the most important factors to
consider when seeking to understand cross-national variations in fertility.
Both moving out of the parental home and forming a stable partnership have
to be seen from a life course perspective, and are, therefore, age dependent. If
people achieve certain conditions before or after they are in the range of ages for
having children, as determined by normative and biological factors, it might have
no influence on their fertility (Beaujouan et al. 2019). The literature on transitions
to adulthood has documented extensively how these transitions affect fertility (e.g.,
Baizán et al. 2003), but it has not quantified how these transitions affect the cross-
national differences in fertility rates we observe today. We hypothesize that the
differences in fertility rates across low-fertility countries would be much smaller
if all of the countries had similar rates of partnership formation and independent
living between the ages of 25 and 40. A proper decomposition of fertility rates
by the ages associated with and the duration of independent living arrangements
and stable partnerships would be an important first step towards confirming our
main hypothesis. It is through living independently and having a stable partnership
that other social and economic changes affect fertility. For instance, cross-country
differences in patterns of independent living and partnership formation might
mirror cross-country differences in structural dynamics, such as labour market
opportunities, access to childcare services, and housing. Societies might have
different strategies for helping young people become economically independent and
form stable partnerships, such as providing them with access to high-quality jobs
and/or generous welfare state benefits. But it might be the case that once individuals
in high-income countries have transitioned to living independently and have formed
a partnership, the most important obstacles to childbearing they face have already
disappeared.
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européenne de Démographie 19(2): 147–169. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1023343001627
Balbo, N., F. C. Billari and M. Mills 2013. Fertility in advanced societies: A review of
research. European Journal of Population 29(1): 1–38. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10680-
012-9277-y
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